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Abstract
Omron Shanghai provides a detailed case-study of a multinational subsidiary’s long-term evolution. The study assesses three streams of international business literature that emphasize the seemingly competing roles of parent firm strategy, national institutions or local management in the development of subsidiaries. It looks at each business function separately to reveal which capabilities were effectively transferred from Japan to China. In tracing Omron Shanghai’s development from international joint venture into wholly-owned enterprise and then global factory, it is the strategic intent of the parent multinational corporations that emerges as the consistent formative influence on management practices and capabilities. 
Keywords: MNCs; strategic capabilities; foreign subsidiaries; global factory; national institutions; Japan; China.
Introduction
Those theorists credited discovering the Multinational Corporation (MNC) as a subject in its own right were concerned with two issues: the rationale of any parent firm undertaking the costly and time-consuming process of creating a subsidiary overseas, and the strategic direction and control exercised by the parent MNC, because of its cross-border transfer of ‘ownership’ advantages in products, technology, or management, over its subsidiaries. Undoubtedly, there were strong trends particular to the post-war global economy – such as the dominance of managerially and technologically advanced manufacturing MNCs from the US, pursuing market-seeking strategies by creating smaller versions of the main company within host nations – that shaped the original ideas about International Business. The first theorists said little about how capabilities could be transferred, and they offered few insights into how internal management structures could ensure the effective use of capabilities in overseas subsidiaries once transferred. Again, for the immediate post-war decades, the historical evidence shows minimal interaction between the headquarters and its subsidiary, despite or because of expatriate managers and technicians.
The conversion of Japanese manufacturers into MNCs, during the course of the 1980s, and notably their arrival in the developed economies of the US and Western Europe generated fresh insights about the aims of FDI. It additionally, if temporarily, re-confirmed the potency of the parent firm: Japanese manufacturers had evolved capabilities in production, skills, human resources and products within their home economy, and they had strong reason to transfer what was perceived as global ‘best practice’ to their new subsidiaries. Subsequent studies questioned the extent to which home nation practices could be relocated and the very concept of global best practice. Supported by empirical evidence, they additionally noted examples of host country adaptation. The stagnation of the Japanese economy, after 1990, reinforced doubts about the usefulness as well as the universal applicability of its companies’ management and systems.
While the majority of FDI stock can still be found in developed economies, investment flows have switched to emerging and transition economies, since the mid-1990s, and most dramatically in the case of China. Nonetheless, there have been few studies of Japanese subsidiary operations and their capabilities in developing nations in general and in China in particular. Due to differences in levels of economic development between the two countries, and China’s policy aim of using inward investment to acquire technological and managerial know-how, Japanese MNCs had both the strategic intent and the opportunity to transfer their practices to their subsidiaries. What is needed as a result is a comprehensive exploration of which systems or capabilities a Japanese firm would choose to transplant to China, and the effects of local, institutional or practical factors on its ability to implement its strategy. A longitudinal approach allows a full assessment of the transfer and management of subsidiary-level capabilities, since the mid-1990s, and an analysis of developments in subsidiaries and their capabilities, since the mid-2000s. We can discover, too, if advances in International Business or IB theory - including the idea of the ‘global factory’ - can fully help explain the recent strategies of Japanese MNCs in China. At the heart of the debate is the ability of the parent firm or the headquarters to exercise supervision of a subsidiary in a host economy versus the extent that subsidiary is nationally embedded. More recently, the emergence of more globalized, networked and interdependent MNCs – replacing the structure of a core parent firm and dependent subsidiaries – was founded on the enhancement of subsidiary capabilities and the consequent decline of parent control. It is possible, on the other hand, that parent MNCs are founding production headquarters, called global factories, and increasing control of their business through a mix of ownership, control, planning, and contracts. Japanese electronic enterprises in China and Omron in particular provide clear insights into the competing factors of parent company capabilities and strategic intent, national institutions, subsidiary level agency, and globalizing tendencies. 
Literature Review: FDI Theory and the Subsidiary
Parent MNC and Strategic Capabilities
As is often recounted, the theory of FDI or the MNE began with the insights of Hymer (1960), and one of his fundamental conclusions was that MNCs had an ‘ownership advantage’ in innovation, costs, finance or marketing that could offset the ‘disadvantage’ of operating in foreign markets. As a consequence, they transferred their advantage from a home to a host economy, and did so intra-firm from the parent to the subsidiary. FDI was not simply the movement of capital but the transfer of company resources. It followed that there would be a need for cross-border monitoring and control by the investing firm, or, that is, international management and organization. ‘Control is desired in order to fully appropriate the returns of certain skills and abilities’ (Hymer, 1976: 25). FDI theory from the outset emphasized the role of the parent MNE in setting overseas strategy and, consequently, designing subsidiary practices, even if it presented little in the way of detail. Hymer shows limited interest in looking beyond the initial act of investment towards those questions of why and how strategies and organizational structures change over time, and in analysing which factors determine variations in degrees of headquarters control and international integration.
Vernon elaborated on the work of Hymer through his ideas on the international product life-cycle. At the early part of a product’s history, overseas demand justifies exports only, but, with growing market awareness and returns to scale, and the accelerating need to gain first mover advantages, the firm undertakes FDI. At a subsequent stage, when rivals put pressure on profits, the parent firm might decide to license cheaper producers or to invest in countries with lower costs. Another scenario is that subsidiaries may acquire the capabilities to export for themselves (Vernon, 1966). As with Hymer, Vernon is primarily concerned with the strategies and decisions of the parent company. He provides little insight into the management aspects of MNCs or industry-specific differences, and leaves open issues of business organization, backwards and forwards integration, and cross-border coordination.
Transaction Costs
Building on the work of Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975), Buckley and Casson (1976, 1985, 1991, 1998) contend that transaction cost analysis explains the need of MNCs for cross-border internal coordination and control. It outlines why, as a consequence, firms would favour producing in foreign markets as a consequence of FDI over exports or licensing. Since they perceive reliance on outside parties as too uncertain, and they need to protect their proprietorial knowledge in products, systems, and markets, MNCs show a preference for the internalization of business activities within managerial hierarchies capable of operating across borders. Limited knowledge of the intentions and actions of others, opportunism, moral hazard, the costs of negotiating and monitoring, the prospects of reputational damage, and asset specificity all add to the risks of markets, partnerships, or contracting out (Forsgren, 2008; Teece, 1981; Teece, 1985; Hennart, 1982; Hennart, 2000; Anderson and Gatignon, 1986).
Buckley and Casson state that Hymer ignores the planning and investment necessary for a parent MNC to build competitive capabilities, and that he is consequently unconcerned with the means of cross-border capability transfer and mechanisms for controlling subsidiaries. Nonetheless, where local firms are entrenched, or potential rivals in a foreign economy possess advantages, a MNC or its subsidiary might seek to reduce costs or risks through strategies of acquisition, merger, joint ventures, or, if appropriate, vertical integration. Although it does address the internal dimensions of the firm, transaction cost theory does not extensively explore the relationship between parent MNC and subsidiary, nor does it mention the ways in which the characteristics and capabilities of parent and subsidiary evolve over time and after the initial act of FDI (Hennart, 1986a; Hennart, 1986b; Hennart, 1982; Hennart, 1994; Hennart, 2000). Furthermore, the emphasis on the strategies and actions of the main company, as a one-way process, means that the subsidiary’s role is portrayed as passive. In reality, parent company control can be a contested terrain that creates dysfunctional internal dynamics within a MNC.
Business historians are - by inclination, or by definition - concerned with the long term development of firms. They have frequently adopted the insights of Penrose (1959) into management resources (as being key to firm growth), and those of Chandler (1962, 1977, 1990) on managerial enterprise (in which a managerial hierarchy is needed to plan and coordinate capabilities in finance, supplies, production, technology, and marketing within firms that compete through returns to scale and scope). Williamson’s theories (1975) on how transaction costs determine the boundaries, size and activities of a firm formalises many of the propositions made by both authors. Penrose and Chandler’s ideas can be extended to MNC business, because management personnel and the internal structures of departments and divisions are needed to coordinate finance, supplies, production, technology and marketing between parent firms and their subsidiaries and across borders (Chandler, 1980; Chandler, 1997). Their perspective delves into the implications of headquarters strategy and management teams, as against lower level operations, resistance, or labour, or, if we move into the arena of IB, the influence of economic and institutional contexts.  
Eclectic Paradigm
Dunning’s highly influential ‘eclectic paradigm’ and OLI framework are based on the idea that only a broad comprehensive approach can explain the complexities of FDI (Dunning, 1980, 1988, 1995, 1998, 2000, and 2003). As is widely known, he uses Hymer’s theory to state that a MNC must have ownership (O) advantages - or internal capabilities in technology, management, human resources, finance, production, or marketing – and it follows that it must be able to transfer those advantages from its home market to a host economy. In his later writings (2008), Dunning specifies three types of O advantage: innovatory capacity, and experience in management and organization (Ownership asset, or Oa); the ability to govern a business organization, and to configure capital, labour and resources effectively and internationally (Ownership transaction, or Ot); and the political, institutional and social context and support that helps MNCs to develop the other two advantages or to substitute for firm-level deficiencies (Ownership institutional, or Oi). Dunning utilizes transaction cost analysis to propose internalization (I) advantages, in which MNCs achieve efficiencies through the coordination of cross-border production, marketing, research, and human resources. The stronger the O-advantages, the greater is the incentive to internalize activities, to found cross-border managerial hierarchies, and to reduce the risks of market-based contracts.
Dunning adds the notion of locational (L) advantages to those of ownership and internalization. MNCs can acquire advantages from being based in differing host locations, due to the existence of R&D networks, lower costs, human skills, intermediate inputs, infrastructure, cheaper finance, and nearness or better access to markets, or as a result of tariffs and other government policies. For Dunning, O-advantages cannot by themselves explain FDI, since a firm with such advantages can in principle continue with exports and licensing. Only where all three OLI factors apply will a firm engage in FDI. Where locational advantages are absent, an export strategy is more likely. Where both locational and internalization advantages are absent, licensing may be the preferred strategy.
The relative importance of the three factors will vary between industries and over time. Teece (2005) points out how the rise of ‘outsourcing’ and ‘off shoring’ from the 1980s onwards demonstrated the growing significance of locational advantages in the strategic calculations of MNCs. Historical evidence shows that the 1980s and more markedly from the 1990s saw MNCs resorting to complex cross-border production networks, and breaking with post-war trends of subsidiaries supplying distinct national or regional markets, whilst relying predominantly on the support of parent company (Fitzgerald, 2014). The greater incidence of cross-border vertical integration suggests, firstly, the growing relevance of internalization and locational advantages as deciding factors in IB strategy. As, secondly, a subsidiary achieves scale, or customizes products, services, or systems, host locational factors become critical, and levels of control and supervision from the parent MNC would perforce decline. Despite some attempts to integrate the OLI framework with the Environment, Systems and Policy or ESP model (Koopmans and Montias, 1971), and with the ‘diamond’ of national competitive advantage (Porter, 1990), the contextual, political or institutional factors determining MNC strategies remain underplayed.
As with its predecessors, the OLI framework has given precedence to the parent MNC and its transferred capabilities. Interpretations have assumed a headquarters-centred rationale for internalization, and stressed the impact of the main company’s strategic planning on shaping the competitive advantages of its subsidiaries. Dunning, in his later writings, saw his eclectic paradigm as a highly flexible framework, which is able to explain the existence of complex international business networks founded on high measures of vertically integrated operations and dispersed capabilities (Mathews, 2009; Dunning, 2009). The dynamic interaction of the three OLI advantage factors can provide for hybrid outcomes in every instance of FDI. Potentially, it may create geographically diffuse business networks and capabilities, as against a model of Multinational Enterprise in which the parent is wholly dominant and capabilities are transferred from parent to subsidiaries in a linear fashion only (Cantwell and Piscitello, 2000). Mathews (2002, 2009) has argued that his alternative LLL framework - involving Linkage, Leverage and Learning – is more applicable to the growth strategies of emerging market MNCs. The approach is based on firms enhancing capabilities by forming alliances or acquiring subsidiaries, and forming business networks different to the established hierarchical parent-subsidiary relationship. FDI is not a result of transferring capabilities from a parent company to a subsidiary, but a means of buying or developing capabilities and transferring them back to the investing firm.
International Political Economy
In contrast to most theorists on the MNE, Kojima and Ozawa look to macro-economic and political factors for answers. Kojima (1973, 1978, 1982, 1985) and Kojima and Ozawa (1984) claim that the first examples of Japanese outward investment in the post-war period aimed to secure the raw materials or components that were required for the home nation’s export-orientated industrialization. Then, Japanese manufacturers undertook large-scale FDI in the developed markets of North America and Western Europe, in order to secure the overseas markets their exports had created but, in the 1980s, put under threat from import tariffs and quotas. Ozawa (1989) shows the participation of the Japanese government in assisting firms to acquire and enhance the competitive advantages that enabled them ultimately to make their breakthroughs both as exporters or international investors. Ozawa (1991) continues that the commitment of Japanese firms and most notably so in the developed markets rested on home nation technological capability. Both Kojima and Ozawa record how Japan had to reach a certain stage of economic development before its leading manufacturers could acquire the ownership advantages to engage in FDI. In contrast to the micro-economic perspective, Kojima and Ozawa’s ideas are embedded in the intellectual traditions of political economy and comparative advantage.
If we examine carefully the timing and circumstances of Japanese companies transforming themselves into MNCs, it was host country political factors, tariffs, quotas, and currency appreciation that persuaded them to abandon international business strategies of exporting. As they set up subsidiaries overseas, Japanese businesses additionally cemented their reputation as world leaders in production management and employment relations, and revealed strong and burgeoning capabilities in R&D. They had acquired and grown these advantages thanks to a particular set of locational, economic and institutional factors in Japan, including government protection of the home market. Japanese MNCs possessed a strong belief in their management systems, albeit coupled with a willingness to learn from and innovatively adapt global best practices. In general, in Western Europe and North America, they preferred to establish wholly-owned, greenfield subsidiaries, over which they could exercise managerial control, minimize any risk to their proprietorial advantages, and most easily transfer from the parent business the products and systems they perceived as the source of their success.
The debate about whether Japanese MNCs markedly implemented their systems within a host economy or whether they incrementally accepted the wisdom of hybrid arrangements remains open, however (Elger and Smith, 1994). In China, joint ventures were initially the regulatory entry price that MNCs willingly paid. At the outset, Japanese and other foreign companies showed the strategic intent to transfer their ownership advantages. Once China relaxed the rules, as we shall see, Japanese MNCs invariably opted for full ownership and managerial control, and saw this change as the trigger for increasing the flow and extent of capability transfer. In what ways, therefore, did these Japanese MNC subsidiaries in China come to reflect the continuation of Japanese-style management? Or do they highlight a series of adjustments over time to local institutional and market pressures? Or do they, instead, demonstrate a trend towards adopting global best practice that superseded distinctly home and host country influences?
Parent MNE and Capability Transfer
Westney (1987) categorized the transfer process undertaken by the parent MNE into four types: ‘elimination’, ‘internalization’, ‘functional equivalents’ and ‘organization creation’. ‘Elimination’ describes the selective transfer of elements of the original model according to their fit with the host context and simultaneously eliminating others that are unsuited. ‘Internalization’ means transferring elements of the original model appropriate to the host context, and simultaneously altering others. ‘Functional equivalents’ imply that the transferred original model can still work or be effective, even where the host context varies greatly from that of the home nation. ‘Organizational creation’ means that an MNC helps to change a host context whenever its original transferred model is ill-suited, a process reflecting the transformative impact of FDI. While there is scope for adjustments within the subsidiary, the emphasis is on the parent MNC’s strategic intent to transfer and on its capabilities in managing the transfer process. Westney (1993) explicitly stresses the strategic intent and power of the parent MNCs, but allows for the uncertainties of host contexts and the hybridization of transfer outcomes. Given a tendency for firms to adopt or to adapt to national or institutional norms – a form of ‘isomorphism’ – the MNC can generate essential innovations. Changes to the transferred model can be intended but, due to imperfect information on the host economy, misinterpretations of the original system, and human error, also unintended.
We can ask if international business theories have over-emphasized the motivation or the power of the MNC to determine subsidiary practices. Where MNCs encounter barriers to their control of a subsidiary, or barriers to the transfer of capabilities, they have to deal with the consequences: for management structures and the locale of decision-making, on the one hand, and in the greater diversity of practices and products, on the other. There is, as yet, a comparatively small amount of research on international management, or the relationship between the headquarters and subsidiaries, and, to mention an issue of growing prominence, the relationship between one subsidiary and another.
Taking a strategy-structure perspective, Ghoshal and Bartlett (1989) identify four types of structure designed to fit varying strategies and environmental contexts: the global (meaning centralized control of subsidiaries by the parent company, and adoption of the parent’s management practices and standardized products or services), the international (the parent retains and controls core competencies, but the subsidiary adapts and leverages non-core competencies, leading to hybrid subsidiary practices), the multinational or multidomestic (the subsidiary exercises a high degree of autonomy and self-sufficiency, and it uses local practices to produce customized products or services), and the transnational (specialized and interdependent subsidiaries directly participate in integrated worldwide operations, with some near to parent practices and others following local national practices) (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). In this taxonomy, the assumption of headquarters strategic control and the one-way transfer of practices remain dominant, as it does in the work of related interpretations (Perlmutter, 1969; Stopford and Wells, 1972; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1986, 1998). For some critics, the schema is too simple, and diverse arrangements may exist in a single MNC. Little is said about what might inhibit practice transfer, such as national institutions, or resistance within the subsidiaries themselves (Doremus et al., 1998; Ruigrok and Van Tulder, 1995; Evans, Doz and Laurent, 1989; Birkinshaw, 2001).

The MNE and the Subsidiary
Those taking a headquarters-subsidiary relationship perspective seek to consider two-way exchanges between subsidiary and parent, the potential for subsidiary-level decision-making, and the influence of the local environment on subsidiary characteristics (Gates and Egelhoff, 1986; Hedlund, 1981; Ghoshal and Nohria, 1989; Arvidsson, 1999; Birkinshaw, 2000; Govindarajan, Gupta and Malhatra, 1999). A subsidiary perspective would go one stage further, by seeing the headquarters as an external factor, and taking the subsidiary as its starting point. With the evolution of vertically-integrated global networks in which subsidiaries can play a central role, and with subsidiaries exporting in the international marketplace, the subsidiary focus has grown in credibility (D’Cruz, 1986; White and Poynter, 1984; Kilduff, 1993; Gupta and Gvindajaran, 1991; Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1996). As the dependence on headquarters resources declines, changes in cross-border governance and local management practices would follow (Beechler and Yang, 1994; D’Cruz, 1986; White and Poynter, 1984; Doz and Prahalad, 1993; Forsgren, Holm and Johanson, 2007; Mudambi and Navarra, 2004; Dorrenbacher and Geppert, 2009).
If the parent MNE and its subsidiaries evolve strategically and organizationally, headquarters-subsidiary relations must inevitably adjust, and this altering relationship in turn affects the strategies, structures and practices of the subsidiary. One potential contributor to this process is the growth in the capabilities of the subsidiary and the agency of local management. From the parent perspective, the headquarters is the formulator of strategy, and it can exercise control over its subsidiaries through formal ownership, on one side, and through its possession and transfer of systems, know-how and personnel, on the other. From a subsidiary perspective, necessary adaptations to local circumstances, the career interests and motivations of subsidiary managers, and resistance to transferred practices can impose limitations and, over time, a lessening of headquarters control. Such subsidiary-level dynamics infer local variations in management practices, and the existence of hybrid systems within a MNC. Attention on the headquarters-subsidiary relationship and the subsidiary itself – adding to analysis of transferred ownership advantages from the parent - broadens our understanding of the MNC. Yet all three perspectives remain concerned with matters of strategy and organization at the level of the firm. They do not by necessity incorporate political or institutional influences on business practices.
In their typology of subsidiary-level strategy and structure, White and Poynter (1984) emphasize variations in product strategies, but they are not seeking to address the effects of the host country institutional environment or the actions of local management and labour. Beechler, Bird and Taylor (1998) conceptualized, firstly, an exportive model, in which the parent MNC’s practices are adopted by the subsidiary as superior with only minor adjustments; secondly, an adaptive model, in which local practices are dominant; thirdly, a closed hybrid model, in which local influences outside the subsidiary are not significant, but the parent template is adapted to the context; and an open hybrid model in which both parent and local practices exist simultaneously. One major factor in the evolution of a subsidiary will be its capacity for organizational learning. Gupta and Govindarajan (1991) provide a knowledge flow perspective to explain how subsidiaries might rely on parent resources, or alternatively develop their own resources by themselves or in cooperation with the parent. A subsidiary with its own specific capabilities could make a contribution to the success of the whole MNC. There remain, nonetheless, limited insights on the impact of local contexts on subsidiaries or the varied factors driving the need for change or subsidiary-level capabilities.
Japanization Literature
The centralization of power within headquarters of Japanese MNCs can be seen as a strategy or a hierarchical management process for the international extension of domestic business models (Hatch and Yamamura, 1996; Seki, 1997; Westney, 1993). For Japanese MNCs, Harzing (2002) notes the nature of parent control and headquarters-driven coordination through the sending of expatriates, bureaucratic rules and standardization, management by results, or acculturation and common values. Groot and Merchant (2000) distinguish between types of control mechanisms to be used in either wholly owned subsidiaries or joint ventures. In the latter, in which there is a greater likelihood of hybrid systems, management strategy has to align partner motivations and organizational strengths, and reflect proportions of equity ownership and board membership. For the participants, contractual safeguards and their monitoring are fundamental.
The literature on Japanization was founded on the notion that strong capabilities were developed in the unique economic and institutional context of the home economy, and motivated Japanese MNCs to transfer their practices abroad. Japanization implied that a global competitive standard had been set and that it was highly transferrable to different national contexts (Turnbull, 1986; Stewart, 1998; Taylor, 1999 and 2001; Saka, 2003; Florian, 2009). The superiority of Japanese lean production was particularly noted (Alder, 1993; Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992; Kenney and Florida, 1993; Abo, 1994; Womack et al., 1990; Florida and Kenney, 1991). Florida and Kenney (1995) argue that Japanese firms, while keeping the substance of their methods intact, had the capabilities for ‘internal adaptation’ by which they could create or alter the working environment in a subsidiary as needed. In their interpretation, the strategic intent of the parent company remains paramount, but global best practice can incorporate measures of adaptation. Japanese MNCs preferred greenfield sites, frequently outside areas of traditional industry, and sought to employ a new committed workforce, which could be trained, socialized and controlled through the appointment of expatriates. Critics have questioned the assumption of superior practices and the raising up of a management ideal that was not itself reflective of the realities or the diversity to be found within Japan. They highlight, in addition, the numerous factors that temper the transfer of capabilities to a host country and to foreign subsidiaries (Alder, 1999; Florian, 2009).
The other important strand of the Japanization literature – on employment systems and human resources – was more concerned with contextual factors and their impact on international system transfer. Yet, while acknowledging the institutional, legal and cultural problems of transferring employment systems, some did see the extensive MNC-ization of systems as feasible (Trevor, 1983; Morris, 1988; Bratton, 1990; Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992; Wood, 1992). Others questioned whether the international diffusion of Japanese work systems as practised in Japan occurred to a meaningful extent, and presented subsidiary case studies to make their point (Turnbull, 1986; Ackroyd et al., 1988; Elgar and Smith, 1994). The degree to which systems could be transferred from one national context to another was higher in cases of FDI than in instances of indigenous firms outside Japan seeking to emulate global best practice. Notably, Elgar and Smith (1994) criticize the idea of contextualization – a simple contrasting of home and host contexts – and argue that the relevant factors are difficult to define and not fixed at any point in time. Competing and contradictory forces – firm level, national and international - continuously shape managerial choices and organizational forms. Some simplistic divergence from or convergence towards some global best practice cannot account for the complex and constantly changing realities.
National Institutions
Established international business literature has emphasised the role of the parent MNC in determining subsidiary practices, a result of its ability to transfer capabilities across borders and its strategic intent. ‘Institutionalism’ - which did not originally show interest in the existence of powerful MNCs and their subsidiaries - is rooted in the idea that national factors determine long-term economic success or business forms. In one strand of this approach, political, administrative, legal and representative institutions explain national economic success by ensuring good governance, inhibiting ‘rent seeking’, and allowing producers to capture their due rewards. In other words, markets were allowed to operate efficiently (North, 1990; Scott, 1995). Management theorists extended this perspective by seeing businesses and entrepreneurial initiative as socially embedded and culturally determined, and, in the neo-institutionalist interpretation, national institutions determine the nature of business ownership and organization. Strong national institutions (exerting isomorphic pressures) would lead to comparatively high levels of homogeneity in management, and create large differences in the business systems of different nations. Debates continue to revolve around the idea that nation states or national economies are highly homogenous, and, by extension, that regional, industry and firm-level continue are relatively unimportant. The very particular emphasis on national institutions and isomorphic pressures to explain the characteristics of firms robs entrepreneurial or managerial initiative or human agency of any substantive meaning. It is difficult to view the influence of national institutions on firms as one-way and linear, and both are subject to continuous change, contradictory forces, and interaction (Tempel and Walgenbach, 2003; Florian, 2009; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Westney, 1993; Whitley, 1992; Lane, 1994; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Smith, McSweeney and Fitzgerald, 2008).
As in the ‘societal effect’ approach adopted by Sorge (1991, 2004), the ‘national business system’ perspective of Whitley (1992, 1999) places a strong emphasis on national institutions determining business systems, and critics have focused on the approach’s assumed levels of national conformity, the lack of human agency, the realities of contested terrains, and the absence of forces of change where homogeneity is characteristic (Smith, McSweeney and Fitzgerald, 2008). The variety of capitalism (VOC) approach accepts the importance of or allows greater space for human agency and firm-level action (Hall and Soskice, 2001), but nonetheless the flow of determinant influences remains linear, that is from the national institutions downwards to business (Smith, McSweeney and Fitzgerald, 2008).
Institutions and MNCs
Rosenzweig and Singh (1991) note how subsidiaries seek external consistency with their local institutional environment and internal consistency as a consequence of cross-border organization. Part companies instinctively seek to maintain control by applying their own organizational models, but the dual pressures of home and host economy practice lead to variations in outcomes. Kotova (1999) and Kostova and Roth (2002) suggest that the levels of ‘institutional distance’ between home and host economy shape the differences between parent and subsidiary. They look at transfer processes as well as outcomes, arguing that host institutions interact and shape the nature of capability transfer, and that the process and results of international capability transfer determine the relationship between the headquarters and local management.
Birkinshaw (2000) argues that subsidiaries develop capabilities ultimately suited to their national or institutional contexts. Others stress the restraints institutions impose on the transfer and internationalization of management practices (Child &Tsai, 2005; Delios and Henisz, 2000; Kogut, Walker & Anand, 2002). Peng (2000) states that no firm or MNC subsidiary can be immune from institutional pressures. Peng (2002) and Peng and Khoury (2009) explore over the short and the long run the influence of institutions on transferred practices. The determining nature of institutions on business organizations and strategies may be especially important in Asian contexts and in cases of state-led development. With respect to China, central and provincial governments are deeply involved in the running of the economy, and political contacts and personal networks are important to all entrepreneurs and key managers (Powell, 1996; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997; Hollingsworth, 2000). But Geppert and Mayer provide case examples of how the interests and agency of local managers are critical to resisting parent company control and to the emergence of subsidiary level capabilities, as a result avoiding the dangers of institutional determinism (Geppert and Mayer, 2006).
Morgan, Whitley and Kristenson (2001) and Morgan and Whitley (2003) present a typology of transfer outcomes, based on the strength of local institutions versus the ability of a MNC to achieve high degrees of cross-border integration. As a consequence, strong institutions and high integration levels will generate extensive examples of hybridity and variation. Morgan (2001) proposes the concept of ‘transnational space’, which MNCs can create in their host country operations, and within which they can develop innovative organizational forms. Lane (2000, 2001) argues for ‘multiple societal environments’ and for the ability of MNCs to structure their activities and goals in different national contexts. The interaction of global best practice and powerful corporate or institutional actors is a cause of varied outcomes in systems.
Overall, institutionalism in its several forms provides an explanation for the hybridization of transferred practices by a parent MNE, but it has to make uneasy accommodations to account for the powerful global forces shaping a national economy, including an investing MNE with substantial managerial, technological and financial resources at its command. While institutionalism can incorporate the evolution of the subsidiary, it has less scope to consider the agency of managers, labour and suppliers. The focus on institutional influences tended originally to see the nation state as intact from global forces and the actions of MNEs. Neo-institutionalism found it difficult to address the fact that MNC subsidiaries would encounter pressure from both their home and host institutions.
Global Factory and Value-Chains
If MNCs evolve away from hierarchical structures towards federative organizations, subsidiaries have greater scope for determining their practices and even influencing MNC strategy (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Andersson et al., 2007). Yet research does not so far confirm how MNCs can act as federations, or the extent to which they seek to do so. Some strands of FDI theory have concerned themselves with the dyadic relationship between headquarters and subsidiary and with issues of global integration versus national responsiveness. Outsourcing, asset seeking FDI strategies, and the vertical cross-border integration of finely-sliced value production chains undermines the need for MNCs to prioritize the search for host nation responsiveness. Subsidiaries with their own strategic capabilities emerge to supply international markets and replace subsidiaries reliant on parent firm capabilities in order to service a host economy. As a result, the federative MNE is portrayed as being replaced by the global factory (Buckley and Gauri, 2004; Yamin and Forsgren, 2006; Mudambi and Navarra, 2004; Yamin and Sinkovics, 2009; Buckley, 2009a; Buckley, 2009b). The existence of the global factory would entail the emergence of lead factories utilizing best practice capabilities in the best-suited location, and could induce a reduction in the role of the parent company and its output. In practice, however, we might see the reassertion of parental company control. The subsidiary loses control of its own activities – embedded in a national institutional network – to a cross-border network. Inevitably, such outcomes would have implications for subsidiary managers and how they perceive their function (Nolan et al., 2002; Strange and Newton, 2006).
The idea of the global factory is seen as rejuvenating international business as a distinctive area of study, and it is fundamentally interested in where business activities should be located and how across borders they should be integrated or controlled. The global factory approach, nevertheless, still has to deal with the issue of production units being embedded in national and institutional contexts and with the potential resistance of local management to external control (Buckley and Gauri, 2004; Rugman and D’Cruz, 2003). The global factory comprises a vertical core and a lateral network of suppliers and service providers. While previous parental control was the result of managerial hierarchy versus contracting-out and markets, in which cross-border internalization was the preferred option, the global factory is a combination of hierarchy, contracting-out and markets. Planning by the parent firm replaces ownership as the main means of control over productive resources (Buckley, 2011). The global factory uses the organizational abilities of the parent company to coordinate its proprietorial technology, marketing know-how, and brands with a network of contracted enterprises. Yet, for some, the global factory design emphasizes operational efficiency and cost cutting over investment in R&D, skills, and the enhancement of capabilities. The use of contracted firms relies on the routinization of work rather than on the development of skills (Nolan et al., 2002; Buckley, 2010; Naghavi and Ottaviano, 2010).
Research Methods and Aims
The research sought to discover the processes of capability transfer by a Japanese company into China. It aimed to trace the development of capability transfer over an extended time-period, and to evaluate the influences of parent business strategy, institutions, and market conditions. A further aim was to compare which capabilities were transferred at different rates and at different points. Access to a number of personnel in differing business functions, therefore, was essential, as was access to both Japanese expatriate and local Chinese managers. The selected case had to be large-scale in both capital invested and number of employees involved. For these reasons, Omron was selected, and the fieldwork was carried out in 2007-08 and in 2012. The interviews were carried out at the level of the subsidiary, in order to observe the locale and effects of capability transfer, and to consider the perspectives of directly participating personnel. Interviews adopted a semi-structured interview approach, based around questions related to the research aims and enabling the comparison of answers, while giving interviewees the opportunity to offer further important details and to explain contexts. Information was also collected from company publications, labour manuals, and newspapers – in part supplied by the Pudong New Area Association of Enterprises with Foreign Investment (PNAAEFI) – and it was used to supplement and triangulate data collected from interviews.
The research posed a number of connected questions:
	To what extent does the case of the Omron subsidiaries in China demonstrate the formative influences of parent MNC, national institutions, or subsidiary personnel on its operations and practices?
	How successfully or fully have Japanese or international business methods been transferred to China, and which business functions and practices reveal over time the greatest transfer propensity?
	Have globalization strategies and trends strengthened or weakened the control of the parent MNC over its subsidiaries?
Omron in China
MNC Strategy
Omron is an enterprise with a long history: founded in 1933, as the Tateisi Electric Manufacturing Company, and as a manufacturer of X-ray timers, it grew in size and capabilities during Japan’s post-war ‘economic miracle’. During 1968, it added its best known trademark to its corporate name to become Omron Tateisi Electronics Company. In the 1980s, the firm joined the wave of Japanese manufacturers that looked overseas to exploit the advantages they had developed in production, products or price, and it established a regional headquarters in The Netherlands (in 1988), Singapore (1988), and the US (1989). It re-founded itself as, more simply, the Omron Corporation, in 1990.
Omron has grown its operations in China through four critical phases. The company’s founder, Kazuma Tateisi, made his first visit to China, in 1974, and began a process of technical cooperation with a number of state owned enterprises (SOEs). In the early 1980s, Omron started a second stage by exporting product parts and licensing technology to an SOE called the Huayi Home Appliance Company. From 1991 to 2000, Omron underwent the critical third stage, when it founded an investment vehicle, a trading operation, subsidiary manufacturing enterprises, and a joint venture with an SOE. The MNC’s investment peaked between 1994 and 1996, with the building of large-scale factories. It created five subsidiaries in total, including, in 1993, its biggest initiative, the Omron (Shanghai) Industrial Automation Company, the joint venture located in Shanghai, and often referred to as Omron Shanghai.
The last, fourth phase began from 2000, when Omron initiated its plan to consolidate and restructure its Chinese factories, with the aim of achieving greater economies of scale and turning them into the MNC’s chief production base. The key change occurred in July 2005, done in pursuit of a global strategy, when the company integrated its three Shanghai subsidiaries into Omron (Shanghai) Company Ltd, or, more simply, Omron Shanghai (and later as OMS). The joint venture with the SOE called the China Perfect Machinery Industry Ltd ceased, and Omron (Shanghai) Industrial Automation was fully incorporated into and became the main component of the new merged subsidiary. Omron Shanghai (OMS) was fully owned by the Japanese MNC, and it was assigned the role of global production headquarters for the whole business. Omron Japan in addition created Omron China – based in Beijing – to deal with central government, to take charge of R&D activities, and to further the development of sales in an expanding domestic market. The MNC revealed a determination to improve the capabilities of its Chinese businesses, in 2004-05, by expanding its R&D capabilities in Shanghai, founding another research facility in Guangzhou, and forging networks with local technological institutions and universities. The company selected Shanghai Jiao Tong University, in particular, as an important partner in product development and recruitment projects. Omron China is a holding company, fully owned by Omron Japan. Both enterprises have formal oversight of OMS, the production headquarters, but OMS coordinates its activities with and reports directly to the parent business.
In its initial FDI in China, from 1991 to 2000, Omron’s strategic motive was to avoid Japan’s high manufacturing costs; in other words, it wanted to create a low cost, low wage production base for worldwide exports. The parent company in Japan designed and developed all products, and sent parts for final assembly in China. Then, to continue the downward pressure on costs, the company began outsourcing to local Chinese suppliers, with the proviso that the parent MNC kept control of and continued to supply key components. A Japanese expatriate executive, OMS’s Production Control Manager, recognized the cost and other advantages of locally sourcing parts. Prohibitive import taxes were a deciding factor. Although the subsidiary had to respond to rising wages in China, the localization of production was essential to any plans for a greater share of a rapidly growing but price sensitive domestic market. Furthermore, local outsourcing would underpin Omron’s subsequent decision to turn its Chinese businesses into its ‘global production headquarters’, because ‘the consideration of cost is vital for our competitiveness in both global and local markets’ (Interview, July 2007).
According to the Chinese Deputy General Manager, ‘Omron Shanghai took over the factories, and also continued to employ the workforce from the old IJV. I was the former factory production manager in the Omron Industrial Automation Company. However, the management system has been restructured and ‘Duzi Management style’ (it means adopting Japanese-style management) has been implemented. Three factories were integrated in order to achieve maximum production capacity, and to reduce the costs and complications of ownership conflicts’ (Interview, July 2007). As well as becoming more directly integrated into international supply and distribution networks, Omron’s Chinese factories had to achieve global production standards. A Japanese expatriate responsible for strategic planning explained: ‘Our company has been introducing the global management idea to our global employees… Omron in China has been concentrating on producing low cost products for global markets in accordance with Omron’s global quality standards, and relies heavily on qualified local managers with knowledge of global management. [W]e see China’s factories as the centre of our business network in the future’ (Interview, July 2007). To effect its international strategy, and to implement best practices, OMS had to employ and educate local managers with the requisite technical expertise and strategic understanding; it needed a better trained workforce; and it had to improve its local R&D capability (Interview, Chinese Executive, Deputy General Manager, 2012). One sign of a global production and sales strategy was the company stating that its products were ‘made in Omron’ rather than ‘made in Japan’.
Decision-making and Control
In founding a global factory, Omron had to address issues of costs, production standards, and international vertical integration, but linked these goals to matters of ownership and management control. During the fourth phase of its business in China, it had initially proposed continuing its joint venture arrangement, but the partner SOE was short of capital and considering its own independent development strategy. During the 2005 consolidation of subsidiaries, Omron took the opportunity to acquire full ownership control. The change in governance facilitated the restructuring and the integration of the factories. More fundamentally, it made the parent MNC more committed to investing in new plant and manufacturing equipment, and its direct operational control assisted the drive to inculcate in its Chinese factories the international production standards that would be the foundation of its global factory strategy.
On the other hand, OMS remained reliant on the parent MNC’s capital and technology, and Japanese expatriates continued to occupy the top managerial positions at the subsidiary, including the roles of president and all the departmental heads, with the notable exception of leadership in the personnel department. There was no reduction in the number of Japanese technical staff, and a support group of technical experts from the parent firm continued to pay frequent visits to Shanghai, in order to monitor and bolster quality control. ‘Localization’ policy produced visible results only amongst the junior and middle-level managerial positions. Chinese managers acknowledged that Omron sought to employ and promote qualified local executives, but, as they were too few in number, the subsidiary remained dependent on Japanese expatriates, most obviously for the transfer and inculcation of expertise in the production and R&D departments, and for supervising the total quality control processes (Chinese executive, Logistics Department Manager, August 2007).
Within the OMS subsidiary, managerial authority and decision-making are organized hierarchically, and managers report on performance every day. According to the Chinese Deputy General Manager, ‘[A]ll managerial staff are required to be highly committed to their job responsibilities, and the range of those responsibilities is clearly delineated, based on the reporting system. That means there are clear formalized and specified procedures to follow for what you can do and what you must do’. While there was a move to increase the responsibilities of Chinese managers, this occurred within procedures set and monitored by Japanese expatriates. When a manager needs authority to act beyond clearly-defined remits, the Japanese General Manager calls a ‘decision-making meeting’ for all important issues and for resolving differing viewpoints (Interviews, Chinese Deputy General Manager, July 2007, December 2012).
Full ownership of the merged subsidiary created in 2005 enabled Omron Japan to control more fully its investment, and to hasten the transfer and development of managerial and manufacturing expertise. OMS can work out its own budgets and short-term plans, and has a level of operational freedom in local R&D projects, subject to the MNC’s overall strategy and the subsidiary’s financial performance. In principle, an ability to diversify and develop products in China can contribute in the long-term to Omron Japan’s global strategy (Interviews, Chinese Deputy General Manager, July 2007, December 2012). Strong direction from the parent MNC was potentially a block on the subsidiary responding adequately to local factors, such as government, regulations, human resources, suppliers, and domestic markets. Omron Japan mixes ‘bottom-up’ reporting on the appropriateness of overall strategy, production management, and R&D with ‘top-down decision-making’. ‘Omron Shanghai is a major subsidiary within the global MNC, and implements the parent company’s strategy according to plan. Although the decisions from Omron are implemented ‘top-down’ through the hierarchy, the decision-makers still need feedback, so Omron China, as a regional headquarters, is responsible for reporting and communicating about its operations. A ‘bottom-up’ reporting system provides reliable information for final decision-making in Omron Japan’ (Interview, Chinese Group Manager, Public Relations and Corporate Communication, August 2007).
On the other hand, Japanese expatriate managers at OMS are wholly reliant on their Chinese counterparts for maintaining good relations with local government in Shanghai, and the parent MNC has to depend on guidance from its subsidiary on matters of politics, public relations, law, and regulations. One of the responsibilities held by the Chinese Deputy General Manager is to ensure the confidence and assistance of local government and other institutions, and to advise the Japanese General Manager and senior managers in Japan. Omron began its dialogue with Shanghai Pudong’s municipal government on the founding of large-scale production, in 1994. When the original promise to build a subway to the suburban area where the factories were located was not forthcoming, Omron was forced to hire a fleet of buses to transport its employees. The company did eventually persuade a new governor to establish the railway line, and the recruitment of better educated civil servants and the creation of the Shanghai Pudong New Area Investment Promotion Division greatly improved the effectiveness of good relations with local government. Chinese managers have the responsibility of ensuring compliance with laws and regulations, and sound relations with officialdom help to guarantee the stable supply of industrial water, electricity and gas. They carry, too, the duties of communicating with employees, reducing labour disputes, inducting personnel, and helping to inculcate Omron’s Japanese corporate culture and philosophy (Interview, Chinese Group Manager, Public Relations and Corporate Communications, August 2007).
Management Resources
With regard to managerial staff, OMS prefers to recruit new graduates and to promote internally. The general manager and department managers – with the important exception of the personnel manager - are directly appointed by Omron Japan, and they are responsible for maintaining production quality and introducing advanced manufacturing methods. Most of OMS’s managerial and technical staff were inherited from the SOE which had once been its joint venture partner. The subsidiary perceives its personnel as experienced in Japanese working methods, and it sees them as more reliable than people who can be hired externally. The Chinese deputy general manager says that OMS promotes local managers according to their expertise, personality and length of service, and that the long-term objective is to replace as far as possible Japanese expatriates with qualified Chinese.
While OMS does not promise Japanese-style lifetime employment, it does require a commitment from its managerial staff to serve on a long-term basis. Accordingly, the practice of internal promotion has become part of its recruitment policy, and, after the merger in 2005, OMS was able to retain most of the middle-level managerial positions for existing local employees. The Chinese deputy general manager explained: ‘The ‘bottom-up’ recommendation process allows current staff to be selected internally [for managerial positions]… there are personality criteria such as a high level of commitment (Interview, February 2008). For open labour market selection, new graduates are preferred. Many managerial trainees are selected from Shanghai Jiao Tong University every year before they graduate. Course grades, skills certificates in computing or foreign languages, and pre-job training at Omron or an internship in another Japanese owned business are determining factors in the first selection process. Chinese managers then organize written tests that explore knowledge and personality profiles, and, once suitability for particular departments is decided, Chinese or Japanese managers conduct personal interviews. The Chinese Deputy R&D Manager also believes that: ‘Omron Shanghai is more willing [than other firms] to recruit fresh graduates with high commitment and a learning capability, and it … emphasizes the importance of cooperating with a first-class university on the development of enterprise products and human resources (Interview, February 2008).
Chinese managers – who occupy the roles of deputy department managers and shop-floor supervisors - remain formally ‘temporary employees’. Staff turnover is rising, because of slow or unlikely promotion prospects, and from increasing job opportunities in foreign-owned and local companies. ‘Staff mobility and a lack of qualified managerial staff remain obstacles to implementing Omron China’s expansion strategy… Recently, Omron proposed building a global management team and developing global insight training schemes for a group of qualified local managers… and offering an international standard skill certificate which can benefit local employees’ future career development’ (Interview, Japanese Production Control Manager, July 2007).
At OMS, internal training programmes are tailored to the manufacturing plan, and include induction for managerial trainees, management knowledge and supervision skills for middle and senior levels, and overseas training programmes for local managers. The Chinese R&D Manager remarks that there is a plentiful supply of well-educated graduates and high quality recruits in Shanghai, but the ‘most important problem is … for Omron’s employees to understand the Japanese management system and corporate culture, not only on paper’, with the process beginning as interns before they graduate (Interview, August 2007). Experienced Chinese staff or Japanese expatriates provide technical on-the-job training, in addition to class room education. Every year, Chinese managers and engineers are selected to visit Japan to acquire up-to-date advanced management and production expertise, and to gain first-hand experience of working in a Japanese factory. The shortest visit is about two to three months, and the longest can last for a year. Extensive training is viewed as an indication of the subsidiary’s commitment to long-term contracts (Interview, Chinese Deputy General Manager, July 2007).
Training began, moreover, to reflect changes in needed strategic capabilities. ‘Originally, Omron required managerial staff who understood Japanese work methods and the Japanese language, and now Omron proposes the learning of ‘global management’ and English. Local managers should have a global concept, with ideas and innovations in mind’ (Interview, Chinese Logistics Department Manager, February 2008). Training programmes aim to develop the managerial staff’s professional and communication skills, including the use of international telephone video conferencing and computerized office automation. Omron’s global strategy rests, in principal, on its subsidiaries engaging in knowledge sharing and complying with global standards in their practices. OMS also has ISO training programmes intended to replace traditional practices with international standards and what the deputy general manager describes as ‘best practices’.
The managerial salary structure contains elements inherited from the old SOE system, including the basic salary, a seniority allowance, a position allowance, a welfare allowance, and an annual bonus. Basic salary has been increasing year on year, due to local labour market pressures. Both seniority, that is length of service, and managerial position contribute to the calculation of the basic salary and welfare benefits. After the creation of OMS, performance-related pay was introduced, and, in China, incentive schemes have been increasingly used in manufacturing enterprises. OMS still emphasizes the importance of corporate culture and organizational values in improving performance, since, while its pay is far above the levels generally available in Shanghai, it is not competitive with locally based Western firms in the electronics industry (Chinese Manager, Finance and Accounting, February 2008). There have been complaints that pay does reflect the working hours at Omron, and employees view working in Japanese companies as significantly more stressful than working in an SOE or for a Western MNC.
The Chinese deputy general manager explained that: ‘A Japanese enterprise pays much greater attention to an employee’s commitment. Every managerial staff member must understand this before joining Omron. Although Omron announces the implementation of global management, it has not introduced global levels of pay. This is still a Japanese MNC, and its corporate culture and values still impact on its overseas subsidiaries’. Managerial pay policies are designed locally, and quite separate from the remuneration of Japanese expatriates, although incomes are boosted by accommodation, transport and medical allowances, and there is the prospect of long-term employment. (Interview, February 2008). Overall, OMS’s human resource development programme addresses two problems: first, the shortage of qualified and experienced local employees, and, second, the reduction of staff turnover. 
Labour and Skills
There exists a large pool of skilled workers and migrant workers in Shanghai’s industrial areas. Most of the permanent shop-floor employees were directly hired from the previous Omron Industrial Automation Co., and they are skilled workers and engineers with many years of experience in electronic manufacturing. The remainder have been selected for their skills, work experience and educational qualifications, such as training certificates, as a result of advertising and individual interviews. Unskilled workers, often migrants from rural areas, are hired on a temporary basis to cope with fluctuating seasonal orders. They are normally engaged in component assembly work, factory cleaning, or warehousing. OMS has contracts with local recruitment agents to hire groups of temporary workers, but prefers, where possible, to employ new graduates from professional skills high schools, because poorly educated migrant workers have what is regarded as inadequate works discipline. The company favours people from the Shanghai area, because it has to offer dormitory accommodation to migrants (Interview, Chinese Deputy Manager, July 2008, December 2012). 
There is also an internal promotion policy for shop-floor workers. Usually, skilled workers can be upgraded to a higher level skill group on their supervisors’ recommendation, related to years of service and performance. The intention is to limit skilled worker turnover, to minimize training costs, and to maintain Omron’s corporate culture and values on the shop-floor. Induction programmes for all shopfloor workers include an introduction to company regulations, and basic on-the-job training through the observing of experienced workers, and the inculcation of work skills by supervisors. Permanent workers receive internal training related to the specific skills they require, and OMS encourages permanent workers to gain certified qualifications from external training providers. However, job rotation practices, which are commonly adopted in the Japanese parent company’s plants, are not found. The Deputy General Manager says: ‘Specific skill development is far more important than breadth of skills training in order to ensure global quality standards in our production headquarters [at Omron Shanghai]. Job rotation assumes workers have a long-term future in the company and the high turnover on the shop floor makes different training programmes for particular employees’ career development too expensive…  (Interview, Chinese Deputy General Manager, February 2008).
As in the case of managers and technicians, OMS selects highly skilled workers to visit the parent company’s Japanese factories every year, and this advanced training is seen as an indication of future promotion. Shopfloor workers complain that their training focuses on operational rules and regulations, but contributes little to skills development. Procedures tend to induce boredom and to demand hard work, with little scope to improve skills. A Japanese expatriate and the Production Control Manager remarks: ‘I think the most important aspect of the shop-floor training process is not the difficulty of skills for local employees, but letting them understand the importance of disciplines, rules and regulations. Shop-floor workers, especially temporary workers, have no intention of following the procedures and regulations. For example, they don’t think tidiness in the workplace would have a negative impact on their job performance. If I push them too hard, it only makes things worse. They explicitly express their unwillingness to follow what they are told to do, especially temporary workers. I cannot penalize them because they are not permanent employees (Interview, July 2007).
The pay grade of workers is linked to skills, as a device to encourage training, and to enhance performance. There is little difference between the salaries of skilled workers and office clerks, in the hope of limiting turnover amongst skilled workers. To balance the extra costs involved in this policy, OMS hires large numbers of cheap temporary workers. Contracted workers have short-term contracts, normally from one to three years. They are not promised lifetime employment but their welfare allowance and job security is much higher than temporary workers’.
Manufacturing
According to a Chinese supervisor employed in production (Interview, February 2008), OMS continues to receive a high degree of technical support from the parent MNC, which had directly transferred advanced manufacturing technology and work methods. It can manufacture most final products without relying on components from Japan. Accordingly, OMS has adopted JIT (Just in Time Management), in a close approximation of Japanese practices, and it participates in a global inventory network in order to reduce costs and to ease production pressures. Through computerized automation control systems transferred from Japan, the subsidiary has achieved economies of scale and mass production, and has obtained the capability to operate twenty four hours a day.
Formal procedures help to ensure that front line operators employ the machinery effectively and efficiently. The Zero Defects Policy requires shop-floor workers to exercise discipline and awareness, although, unlike the situation in Japan, it is front-line supervisors that actively maintain this commitment. In addition, the subsidiary follows Japanese 5S factory management, considered to be the foundation for maintaining an efficient work space and for building mutual understanding about processes: namely, seiri (sort), seiton (systemize or set in order), seiso (shine, or clean and maintain), seiketsu (standardize, or maintain high standards), and shitsuke (self-discipline, or initiative) (Interviews, Chinese Production Supervisor, February 2008, December 2012). After its formation, OMS updated all its production lines with the latest technology in order to emulate performance in Japan. Before any new product is introduced, at least a year’s preparation is needed. Chinese engineers are sent to Japan to witness the production process and to gain experience on-site. Omron Japan will send expatriates to give lectures and seminars on any new production technology. These Japanese experts are responsible for installing the production lines, and stay on a long-term basis to ensure correct working methods and machine maintenance.
OMS’s Chinese Deputy Manager says: ‘Following the formal procedure is not difficult for shop-floor workers, as a result of our basic training courses. However, front-line operations are partly manual and partly automatic, which requires shop-floor workers to have positive work attitudes to improve their performance and skills. Semi-automation requires much more skill than automatic operations. Shop-floor workers have no idea what workers do in a Japanese factory and they rely on gaining insights from supervisors and Japanese expatriates. Personal communications have proved to be an effective way to deal with ambiguous problems and to ensure the diffusion of the transferred work methods’ (Interview, February 2008).
OMS has implemented an expatriate-dependent quality control process, and regularly sends personnel from the parent company to the subsidiary. The Japanese Production Control Manager remarks: ‘Omron Shanghai emphasizes quality more than cost reduction, and, if raw materials and product parts cannot reach the required standards, it prefers to import more costly parts from Japan’. Local quality control rests on two procedures. One method is to set up quality checkpoints for every production process monitored by quality control groups for all major production lines. These groups report the inspection results horizontally to Omron Japan’s quality control department and vertically to the subsidiary’s General Manager. To be qualified to undertake inspections, local product quality inspectors receive at least two weeks’ training and testing. The second method was to install built-in computerized inspection monitors, as invented by Omron Japan. In time, OMS claimed its quality pass rate was second only to Omron factories in Japan (Interviews, July 2007, December 2012).
Yet the parent MNC could not fully transplant Japanese total quality control. OMS implemented factory production management and quality control through the heavy use of expatriate supervision and advanced manufacturing equipment rather than through high quality and multi-skilled shop-floor workers who are committed to output standards and innovation. The factories at OMS, as a designated production headquarters for a global strategy, are rich in advanced manufacturing equipment or hardware, but lack the software of committed, self-motivated workers with the highest skills level. The Japanese Production Control Manager adds: ‘In Japan, our total quality control is built into the production process, and shop-floor workers are committed to their jobs but there is a different situation in China’s plants. I think we have enough rules and regulations in the frontline operations, but the workers keep ignoring them, because they think they are not necessary. It is difficult to change their attitudes and some shop-floor workers are temporary workers, and we have no system and regulations to punish them if their behaviour doesn’t follow the work procedures’ (Interview, July 2007). The Chinese Deputy General Manager said that some shop-floor workers receive merely a brief induction before being put on to the frontline. Without proper training, quality education, and experience, they cannot be expected to meet the preferred standards, but, in China, there is a trade-off between labour cost and labour quality. OMS has been introducing Japanese production methods, but global ‘best practices’ have to be adapted (Interview, December 2012).
The development of supplier networks is an important strategic aim, and Omron views competent local suppliers as vital support for scaled production factories and for meeting the demands of global markets. The importing of parts from Japan is expensive and increasingly uncompetitive. Omron continues to show a bias for those Japanese suppliers that had set up facilities in China to meet orders from MNCs, yet they are unable to meet all of OMS’s orders. The subsidiary has as a result forged links with local Chinese suppliers, providing technical support in order to improve the quality and to secure the quantity of components. The strategy, on other hand, is long-term. The Japanese expatriate responsible for strategic planning notes that OMS is able to make most of its components within its own factories, and that, critically, it imports key or high technology parts from Japan (Interview, July 2007).
R&D and Marketing
Omron Japan is responsible for product design and research development. It has retained its core R&D capabilities in its home economy, and decides which technologies will be transferred according to its global manufacturing plan. Nonetheless, Omron in Shanghai founded an R&D centre in 2000, and it trains technicians and engineers in cooperation with Jiao Tong University. Since 2005, the MNC’s declared global strategy is to share R&D knowledge amongst its home and overseas businesses, and, to that end, it has been willing to concede the traditional autonomy of the parent company. Nonetheless, the Chinese Human Resources and Administration Manager, at the Omron China holding company, makes the point that ‘90 per cent of Omron Shanghai’s products have been designed, developed and tested in Japan. Omron Japan has a cutting-edge research laboratory for basic science technology development, with a substantial budget, and train a significant group of qualified scientists’. Therefore, OMS’s R&D centre mainly undertakes the adaptation of products for different markets, and does not engage in fundamental research. It is closely tied to marketing considerations, and trains local engineers and technical staff in cooperation with Jiao Tong University. Omron’s global strategy is to share different R&D knowledge among its overseas subsidiaries, and it is willing to give away some autonomy, seeing young graduates from China’s best universities as a huge talent pool. It sees the young graduates from China’s best universities as a large human resource pool (Interviews, February 2008, December 2012).
R&D funding mainly depends on OMS’s financial performance, with Japan providing technical support rather than finance. It adapts core technology, and helps to design some small household products. The growing demand for quality products in China has encouraged the expansion of local R&D (Interview, Deputy R&D Manager, February 2008). In overseeing the absorption and adaptation of technology and products from Japan, the R&D centre has to coordinate closely with the production and marketing departments, which advise on the step-by-step adjustment of designs or improvements in product quality. Once production has begun, the R&D centre has to monitor production and quality standards in line with the global standards. Omron had originally assembled products in China for re-export, and it had established Omron China in order to build a domestic sales network that could better meet growing levels of demand. According to the Japanese Production Quality Manager, Omron Japan sought to replicate and develop global marketing standards in China, and the subsidiary organizes training courses in combination with the parent MNC. Omron Japan leaves the management of distribution, sales and advertising to local personnel, with their better understanding of the Chinese market, and encourages them to share their experience and knowledge with Japan and all overseas subsidiaries (Interview, July 2007).
Implications
We set out some implications by answering a set of key questions.
To what extent does the case of the Omron subsidiaries in China demonstrate the formative influences of parent MNC, national institutions, or subsidiary personnel on its operations and practices?
In other words, if we follow three important streams of FDI/IB literature – parent company strategy, institutionalism, and subsidiary agency – can we adequately explain the evolving case of OMS? The evidence reveals that, if we are to understand its development, since 1993, there have been a number of determining factors. At the outset, two factors set the context in which the subsidiary operated. The institutional framework, namely central government insistence that investing foreign firms establish joint ventures with state-owned enterprises, directly shaped ownership and management structures. Huayi Home Appliance Company had representation on the board, and it had the right to appoint members of the senior management team. It was, furthermore, its HR system that was transferred to OMS, although it was the Japanese MNC that took on issues of training and skills and implemented needed changes. For obvious reasons of pragmatism, Chinese managers were responsible for all employment matters and for contacts and negotiations with Shanghai’s civic authorities.
On the other hand, one reason for Communist China encouraging FDI and the joint venture condition was to access the managerial and technological capabilities of foreign companies. Marked differences in the economic development of home and host economies were at the root of the leverage Omron exercised, as the parent MNC, in order to control the day-to-day activities and ultimately the long-term evolution of the subsidiary. Contrary to some theories, the strictures of joint venture did not restrain the commitment of Omron Japan to dispatching key personnel to influence and control much of the subsidiary. Indeed, the MNC’s capabilities in transferring, maintaining and improving technology, production, product quality, and work skills became increasingly entrenched through its use of expatriates and the involvement of the parent MNC. Japanese managers took on the tasks of subsidiary chairman and heads of all departments, with the sole exception of human resources. From the outset, management decisions were made in conjunction with Omron Japan, not only through the subsidiary headquarters, but with Shanghai staff in production and other functions talking directly to other relevant operational staff in Kyoto.  
Against the influences of institutional regulation and the state-owned enterprise partner, it was the transfer of sought capabilities, the control the parent MNC operated through its capabilities, and the expatriate team needed to supervise transferred systems that determined the agenda for OMS. The creation of a wholly owned subsidiary gave the parent the possibility of strengthening its control. The transformation of the ownership structure coincided nonetheless with the strategic decision to convert OMS into a global factory. For this objective, in principle, the capabilities of the subsidiary and the agency of its managers would have an enhanced role, and OMS would become more networked with other Omron subsidiaries and less dependent on its interactions with Japan. The Omron case, at this juncture of its history, highlights how the parent firm acts as a dynamic rather than a fixed element on the evolution of the subsidiary. Omron aspired to be a global business rather than as a Japanese-dominated business with overseas satellites. The parent company remained the driving force behind the adding of global product and production standards to Japanese systems, and, while the agency of the Chinese managers was an important part of the process, their commitment was to effective implementation of imported international practices. Admittedly, the ability of the labour force to reach these goals remained an objective as opposed to a task achieved, but OMS did become at any early point capable of making products for world markets. Both Japanese and Chinese managers and supervisors were needed in the upgrading of work skills, factory discipline, and output quality.
How successfully or fully have Japanese or international business methods been transferred to China, and which business functions and practices reveal over time the greatest transfer propensity?
The complex influences and interactions of parent company, national institutions and local management meant that some measure of adaptation and practice hybridity at OMS was inevitable. We should not anticipate uniform practices within either single national economies or a single MNC. From the beginning, Omron Japan made clear its strategic intent to transfer its products and production processes, and the joint venture arrangement, a condition set by the Chinese government, and other institutional contexts were supportive of its intent. Omron’s managerial and technological lead and its belief in the effectiveness of its capabilities led to a high transfer propensity. The term ‘transfer capability’ refers to the ability of a firm to conduct transfer due to its size, power resources, technology and international experience, all of which Omron possessed. The term ‘transfer propensity’ refers more directly to the strategic intent of a firm, or its commitment to installing its capabilities within overseas subsidiaries. Moreover, for the period of the joint venture, and additionally since the formation of a wholly owned enterprise, Chinese managers expressed their wish to implement Japanese or global best practice. There is small evidence of ‘partial transfer’ in the sense of a parent MNC selectively adapting practices to make them a ‘best fit’ to local conditions, since there was confidence that the core of the parent systems could be transferred.
Undoubtedly, and for several reasons, some adaptation was necessitated in practice at the level of subsidiary operations. During the period of the joint venture, production and quality processes relied more heavily on managerial supervision than in the case at the parent firm, since there remained difficulties over skill levels, quality expectations and work attitudes amongst the labour force, themselves linked to the nature and stability of employment in China. Yet, under the wholly owned subsidiary, none of these issues were considered problematic enough to jeopardise greater investment and the expansion of output. With the benefit of greater ownership, Omron Japan showed greater strategic intent to improve the capabilities of its subsidiary, whilst simultaneously increasing cross-border control and interdependence. The expansion of in R&D in China was part of its new policy towards its subsidiary, although these new arrangements concentrated on product customization, while core product and production knowledge was maintained at home. There was no contradiction between the aims of parent control, greater local capabilities, and a global strategy.
Japan-grown and later international systems in production were transferred to the subsidiary, and Chinese managers took an active role in instilling these practices. Key and advanced components were imported from the parent firm, and Omron Japan encouraged its suppliers to invest in China. But local sourcing was integral to the long-term reduction in costs, in line with the pursuit of export markets and subsequently the global factory strategy. The reality of ‘partial’ JIT management was a consequence of an unstable local supplier network and lower component quality, and quality control rested on the enforcement of procedures by front-line supervisors rather than the work teams or individual workers. There was never any intent to transfer human resource systems, although a parent-led but customized system of training was introduced. Multi-skilling was not sought, due to the short-term employment horizons and labour-intensive assembly operations typical at the subsidiary. Performance related pay was used – a common hybrid innovation - to secure employee motivation.
Omron demonstrates the complexity of measuring degrees of centralization-decentralization and levels of practice hybridity for an MNC or even a subsidiary as a whole. The interacting influences of MNC strategy, institutions and local managers have affected each business function differently. The parent firm maintained a strong control over production, products and R&D, and accepted greater delegation for human resources, host country marketing, and external affairs. The functions of production, product development and technology at the subsidiary reflected patterns of MNC strategy and intent, whereas those functions related to employment and pay were more markedly reflective of institutionalised and contextual patterns in China. Differences between functions were based on perceived necessary responses to international versus local conditions, or to the demands of required cross-border integration (led by the MNC) versus domestic assimilation (shaped by institutions). ‘Harder’ or more tangible capabilities were easier to transfer internationally than ‘softer’ or less tangible capabilities in human resource practice, leaving aside some convergence in skills towards a Japanese or international standards through training programmes.
Have globalization strategies and trends strengthened or weakened the control of the parent MNC over its subsidiaries?
As a transitional economy, undergoing degrees of ‘de-institutionalization’, China offers greater scope for MNC parent strategies, widening scope in the selection of competing international practices, and more space for subsidiary management agency, or at least China has done so in specific manufacturing industries, such as electronics. The search for increased local management capabilities and agency does not perforce mean greater independence from parent company ownership, control or direction. The continued and pivotal role of the parent suggests a persistent dominance effect by those MNCs and nation states in charge of key economic resources and capabilities.
One aim of Omron in establishing a wholly owned subsidiary, in 2005, was, as we have seen, to transfer and develop the international best practices needed for a global factory. In theory, OMS would become integrated with the MNC’s global network, and move beyond mainly reporting to and coordinating with the parent firm. Omron Japan confirmed that Shanghai would form its main international production base. The subsidiary had begun as an international joint venture and as a brownfield operation reliant on the transplanting of Japanese technology and methods through parent company control and expatriate personnel. The mechanisms were available for the transfer of additional production processes and R&D activities, and for the inculcation of international standards.
If we look for insights from managerial strategy literature, the Resource Based View would suggest that the parent MNC has a powerful means of controlling a subsidiary through its ownership of core capabilities. Can we take the parallel interpretation that advanced or rising capabilities within a subsidiary act as a counter to parental control? Omron’s has been a strategy of efficiency seeking, in location and labour costs, and of off-shoring production in China. OMS on its founding prioritized export markets, but its conversion to a global factory with a central place in a cross-border value chain occurred in parallel to acquiring greater responsiveness to China’s expanding domestic market. Although the aspiration to be a global factory did see attempts to inculcate international standards and practices, the control as well as the ownership of the parent MNC over its subsidiary did not decline but in fact increased.
Conclusion
The strategic motivation for the founding of Shanghai Omron was efficiency-seeking and the meeting of export demand. Omron was obliged by the institutional requirements of the time to adopt a joint venture with a state-owned enterprise (SOE). The parent MNC revealed a strong strategic intent to transfer practices to its subsidiary, with the pragmatic exception of human resource policies which was based on Chinese SOE traditions and left to Chinese managers and from which Japanese expatriates exempted themselves. Institutional isomorphic pressures (if mainly in human resources) existed alongside the MNC’s need for cross-border symmetry (most obviously in production methods and quality standards). Given the joint venture arrangements, Omron was cautious about the transfer of its core technology and technological knowledge, but effectives in transferring its production and product quality even if inevitable variations in processes and outcomes were detectable.

When Omron Shanghai was converted into a wholly owned enterprise, it accelerated the transfer of capabilities, including R&D, and indicated the ingrained caution commonly associated with Japanese businesses about the loss of proprietorial knowledge to strategic partners. The formation of a wholly owned subsidiary coincided with Omron’s adoption of its global factory policy, with China as the low cost production centre manufacturing for world markets, and the policy was based on the inculcation of international as opposed to strictly Japanese ‘best practice’. To expand production capacity, and to optimize product quality, the MNC sought to enhance the role of local management and subsidiary capability, while integrating the Chinese operation more fully with its international networks and ensuring tight parent company involvement. In dealing with changes in the nature of global competition and MNC business structures from the 1990s onwards, Omron was able to maintain its competitive position by merging international, home grown and host country subsidiary practices and to pursue a global factory strategy while increasing the role of the parent firm within the MNC. While Omron Japan retained leading capabilities that enabled it to achieve its strategic objectives, it showed itself adaptable enough to learn from and to absorb international best practices.

What does the case of Omron in China reveal about the characteristics of international business or the specific issues caused by FDI? How, therefore, did Omron deal with the changing requirements of cross-border transactions and organization, or with differing macro-economic or institutional environments? The idea of the global factory – seen as renewing IB as a distinctive area of study – saw the dyadic parent-subsidiary relationship as superseded by a more complex set of questions about where business activities should be located, integrated and controlled in order to meet a global demand. Yet, alongside the lateral network of suppliers and service providers at Omron, the vertical core includes the headquarters (which owns or controls key capabilities) and the main production unit (in which key capabilities are located). Differences in the economic development of Japan and China are connected to differences in the capabilities of the Omron parent firm and OMS, and to the overall acceptance of local management to the adoption of Japanese or international standards and practices and to parent firm control. In converting its subsidiary into its main production unit, Omron Japan had to continue the process of capability transfer, and reinforced its ownership and control. It has not adopted a strategy of coordinating its proprietorial technology and products amongst a network of contracted producers. As a result, its approach to being a global factory has not seen a cutting of investment in R&D and skills, but, since ownership and control of the subsidiary has been maintained, the opposite. The major feature in the evolution of OMS, its management practices, and capabilities – as an international joint venture, as a wholly-owned enterprise, or as a global factory – has been the strategic intent and influence of the parent business, when compared against national institutions or local management agency. The case of Omron China fits with the growing sway of MNCs over global production, technology, investment and trade. It highlights, in addition, questions about how governments retain the commitment of MNCs to the transfer and enhancement of strategic resources and capabilities, while the control MNCs exercise over subsidiaries, associated with that commitment, may place constraints on the economic benefits to the host economy.
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